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Preface
For over 27 years, Red Flag has been considered the Air Force's premier air combat exercise.
Thousands of aircrew, intelligence analysts, and other support personnel have endured long days and nights planning for, arguing about, and flying in Red Flag missions. However, anyone who has been to Red Flag in the past five years knows the exercise has undergone dramatic changes.
Red Flag is not just for fighter pilots anymore. Today's Red Flag includes a diverse mix of participants, each hoping to get ten realistic combat training missions in a two-week period. As a result of realistic training programs instituted after Vietnam, today's aircrew are better trained than their predecessors. Ironically, the result is that they are continually frustrated by the numerous "Red Flagisms" inherent in the exercise. They are told to focus on the tactical problem of the day even though they are trained to think operationally. They are told to fly through threats to hit individual targets, even though their experience tells them to roll-back enemy ground threats with stealth, electronic warfare aircraft, and precision-guided bombs.
Realistic training at Red Flag, just like the joint forces it is intended to train, is in a period of transition. This paper will offer some insight into these changes-gained from my three-years serving as Red Flag's Chief of Intelligence-and offer some recommendations on how to take Red Flag to a new level of realistic training.
I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my thesis advisor, Dr. Michael Grumelli, who gave me the latitude to explore this important topic but then helped me focus my thoughts into a "doable" project. I would also like to thank Mr. Gary Sambuchi, Red Flag Project Manager at v HQ ACC, who kept me appraised of the future changes in Red Flag. Finally, I would like to recognize the hard work and dedication of the Red Flag and Nellis CAOC staffs. Despite facing overwhelming odds, plenty of criticism, and sometimes disappointing feedback from the Air Force promotion system, these great Americans make Red Flag the best air combat training program in the world. They deserve nothing but praise for their efforts.
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Abstract
For almost 30 years, Red Flag has given relatively inexperienced aircrew-Blue 4-a chance to experience eight to ten realistic combat missions in a high threat, but safe environment.
It has also given more experienced pilots the chance to serve as package commanders and learn how to best employ an integrated large-force package to achieve a tactical objective. However, as the complexity of air operations has increased-with the advent of network-centric warfare, precision-guided munitions, stealth technology, and the integration of special operations, space, and information warfare into the Combat Air Forces-so has the pressure to change Red Flag to include more platforms and expand its training focus. The Air Force now has an historic opportunity to foster a new era of realistic training. More importantly, the expansion of Red Flag-without corresponding improvements in the range, aggressor, and assessment capabilities-will actually decrease the training value of Red Flag. Transforming Red Flag will not come "on the cheap" as did the original Red Flag exercise that simply combined pre-existing Aggressor capabilities and range space. This paper reviews the origins of Red Flag, highlights recent changes in the exercise, and provides recommendations on how to guide the transformation of Red Flag. Anyone who has attended Red Flag probably knows what the exercise was designed to achieve. Following a dramatic drop in the Air Force's air-to-air kill ratio between the Korean War (10:1 ratio) and the Vietnam War (2:1 ratio), a group of fighter pilots working in the Headquarters Air Force, Directorate of Operations hatched a proposal to create a training exercise intended to replicate the stresses of combat. The goal was to give a pilot his "first ten combat missions" in a realistic, but safe learning environment. Despite facing some initial resistance, one of the pilots-Major Richard "Moody" Suter-persisted with the idea until he found an ally in the Tactical Air Command (TAC) commander, General Robert Dixon. Less than five months after Gen Dixon approved the concept, the first Red Flag exercise took place.
For his efforts, Suter is often called the "father of Red Flag," and the Red Flag building at Nellis AFB, Nevada bears his name today.
For almost 30 years, the Red Flag exercise has trained relatively inexperienced airmen to survive in combat. Red Flag's training focus has been on Blue 4-Lieutenants and Captains who are competent in their aircraft, but lack experience flying as part of a composite strike force. Red Flag has also given more experienced pilots-senior Captains and Majors-the opportunity to serve as package commanders, either for the overall Red Flag mission or for their particular mission area (i.e. Offensive Counter Air, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, etc.) Mission commander training allows these senior pilots to learn how to best employ an integrated largeforce package to achieve a tactical objective.
However, as the complexity of air operations has increased-with the advent of networkcentric warfare, precision-guided munitions, stealth technology, and the integration of special operations, space, and information warfare into the Combat Air Forces-so has the pressure to change Red Flag to include more platforms and expand its training focus. This paper will consider the changes Red Flag has undergone since its inception, evaluate the impact of those changes, and make recommendations for ways in which to improve realistic training. The main question this paper seeks to answer is: "Should Red Flag expand beyond Blue 4 and Mission Commander training?" Asked another way, "Would Moody Suter approve of today's Red Flag exercise?" In order to answer these questions, it is important to understand the historical context that drove the need for Red Flag.
Historic Trends in Combat Losses
As previously indicated, USAF air combat effectiveness (as measured by the air-to-air kill ratio) decreased significantly during the Vietnam War. Disturbed by this trend, the Air Force set out to identify the root cause of its loss in proficiency. The USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center (TFWC) at Nellis AFB was tasked to conduct a series of studies-called "Project Red
Baron"-to analyze Vietnam War air-to-air engagements. An interim report released in 1972 identified three significant trends. First, the report found that multi-role fighter units were expected to perform a broad range of missions, and pilots lacked proficiency across the board.
Due to this lack of specialization, home-station training was measured purely in the number of hours flown regardless of what type of training was conducted. Second, most USAF pilots who were shot down never saw their attackers, and did not even knew they were being attacked. The report concluded that since pilots routinely trained against larger US aircraft from their own squadrons, they were unaccustomed to looking for smaller, more agile aircraft flown by North Vietnam. Finally, USAF pilots were unfamiliar with enemy fighter tactics and aircraft capabilities, and did not develop or train with tactics intended to exploit enemy weaknesses. As a result, they were unable to adapt to the faster maneuvering they experienced in dogfights against North Vietnamese fighters.
2 Aircrew training and proficiency problems were not just limited to the Vietnam War. The Litton Corporation studied air combat trends in every conflict from World War I through the Vietnam War, and concluded that a pilot's first ten combat missions were the most critical. 3 Once an aircrew survived his first ten missions, his chances for victory and survival increased dramatically.
Graduated, Realistic Training
The lessons of these studies were quickly disseminated throughout the Air Force, and senior leaders directed dramatic changes in aircrew training. In response to the observation that multirole fighter units could not effectively train in all missions, the Air Force specified a primary and secondary Designed Operational Capability (DOC) for each squadron-focusing on either air-toair or air-to-ground missions. The DOC reduced the number of roles these aircraft were required to perform, and allowed pilots to specialize in their assigned mission. Rather than focusing on the quantity of hours flown, the DOC training measured the quality of training missions. 4 In order to address the problems of visually identifying enemy fighters and developing tactics to exploit enemy weaknesses, TAC Commander General Dixon started an initiativecalled "Readiness Through Realism"-to make training more intense and realistic than in the past. One key recommendation from the Red Baron report stated, "Realistic training can only be gained through study of, and actual engagements with, possessed enemy aircraft or realistic controllers who controlled aggressor aircraft using Soviet methods. 6 Two of these Aggressor squadrons were permanently based at Nellis AFB, one was stationed in England, and one was based out of the Philippines.
Improvements were not just limited to air-to-air training. In 1975, TAC initiated a program called CORONET REAL to improve air-to-ground training by upgrading Air Force ranges with realistic target displays, ground threat simulators, and assessment equipment. 7 Previously, training ranges provided generic range targets-such as painted bull's-eyes or stacked oil drums-that did not resemble realistic enemy targets. Under CORONET REAL, US training ranges were upgraded with improved target complexes-often using excess military equipment-that included tank concentrations; mock-ups of enemy surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA); and even large industrial complexes. Electronic warfare (EW) ranges at Nellis AFB and Eglin AFB, Florida were also created using ground threat simulators to mimic a Soviet-style integrated air defense system (IADS). Manned SAM and AAA radar simulators not only emitted signals similar to the threats they were replicating, but they also tracked targeted aircraft and recorded miss distances on a computer for later analysis.
The range complex also placed Styrofoam rockets called "smokey SAMs" around key target areas to give visual cueing of a shoulder-fired SAM launch. 
Early Evolution of Flag Exercises
Initial feedback from aircrew participating in Red Flag exercises was overwhelmingly positive. In its first year, Red Flag held nine exercises and trained 2,500 aircrew from all USAF commands, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the 
Red Flag Today
The day is coming when prompt global strike will be a reality, when the kill chain will be reliably and consistently compressed to minutes instead of hours or days, and when the sum of all our sensor, command and control, and information capabilities will be a cursor on the target and steel on the enemy.
14 -Gen John Jumper, CSAF Sight Picture, As discussed in the previous chapter, Red Flag training was intended to mirror contemporary Air Force, joint, and coalition warfighting capabilities and doctrine. So it is no surprise that today's Red Flag-designed to realistically train the integrated force described above-is more complex and dynamic than ever before. This chapter will provide a brief overview of today's Red Flag exercise, looking at recent changes to the framework, participants, and training focus of the exercise.
Today's Red Flag-with between eight and ten two-week periods each year-trains over 13,000 aircrew, intelligence analysts, and support personnel annually. Exercises typically give participants time to roll back the enemy air defense network before flying strike missions.
As in the past, today's Red Flag tests Blue Forces' ability to confront an advanced enemy force employing a robust threat using increasingly complex tactics. However, a number of new initiatives introduced over the past five years have increased the scope and complexity of today's Red Flag exercises.
Integrated Aggressor Force
In recent years, the Red Force has upgraded its capabilities and expanded the types of threats it can replicate. In 1989, the air aggressors upgraded to F-16 aircraft that can simulate the tactics strike packages had to be routed through one of the EW training ranges on their way to their designated targets just to get experience flying in a high-threat environment.
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The 1975 CORONET REAL initiative aimed to fix this problem:
By 1982 the TFWC Range must be able to increase its support to large, multiaircraft exercises, tests, and training programs in a realistic combat environment…. On the Caliente and Tonopah Electronic Warfare Ranges, more than 100 electronic threats and numerous aggressor aircraft will be required, controlled through a semiautomatic integrated air defense system (IADS).
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However, today's range is largely unchanged from that used in the original Red Flag exercises. The majority of range targets still resemble Soviet-style formations of tanks, convoys, and SAM batteries. Ground threat simulators can only simulate older-generation threats such as the SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-8, Roland, and AAA fire control radars-systems similar to those found in Iraq during Operation DESERT STORM. Additionally, contractor manpower shortfalls limit the number and duration of threat emitters supporting the multitude of range activities.
24
More significantly, range threats are only capable of emitting a signal that will trigger a fighter aircraft's radar warning receiver, but do not provide useful training for ISR, stealth, or EW participants who normally monitor or target the associated communication systems and "links and nodes" of a true enemy IADS. The result is that many Red Flag participants do not employ their systems as they would in an actual conflict-clearly not giving these participants realistic training.
Another limitation of the NTTR is that it lacks a realistic low-altitude threat. During the opening days of Operation DESERT STORM, the US quickly learned that the most dangerous place for a fighter to operate was below 10,000 feet. Yet the NTTR does not have systems designed to simulate or assess non-guided AAA-one of the most significant threats aircrews face in any potential conflict area. As a result, Red Flag participants-focused more on surviving the mission than following realistic tactics-routinely operate at low-level in order to evade detection by Red air and radar systems. Similarly, "smokey SAMs" do not trigger IR jammers or missile launch detectors found on most modern helicopters and tactical airlift aircraft, and cannot be assessed to determine if an aircraft was "killed" by the missile.
Assessment tools have also not kept pace with evolving Air Force and joint capabilities. 
Jack of All Trades, Master of None
One of the biggest criticisms of Red Flag over the past few years is the fact that-with the increase in specialized training events such as TST; CSAR; GSTF with stealth, space, and IO;
IADS roll-back; SOF; and airlift-the exercise is becoming too diluted in its training focus.
Every new training event often comes at the expense of another. A second challenge to realistic training comes with the concept of rolling back the enemy IADS, either as part of a GSTF campaign or through execution of an integrated EW, SEAD, and DEAD campaign. Today's aircrews are fully conversant in the various ways in which to degrade an enemy's air defense system, and they expect to employ this in Red Flag. In actual combat operations, targeting critical components of an IADS is the best way to gain and maintain air superiority. However using bomber aircraft-capable of employing dozens of simulated GPSguided munitions from stand-off ranges-to preemptively destroy ground threats on the NTTR denies valuable surface-to-air threat training that tactical aircrew can only get at Red Flag.
Additionally, the robust mix of EA-6B, F-16CJ, DEAD aircraft and non-kinetic capabilities are often literally fighting over who gets first shot at the limited number of threat simulators on the range, and few threats may remain when strike aircraft enter the threat area. The end result is that aircrew participating in Red Flag exercises may be learning the wrong lessons: that a handful of EW, SEAD and DEAD missions will be sufficient to roll back a modern enemy's IADS in just one mission.
Another challenge is the trade off between conducting CSAR training compared to the loss in large-force execution training when all assets are focused on rescuing a downed aircrew. Red
Flag exercises typically include daily CSAR missions to pick up a downed aircrew on the range.
However, two or four missions each exercise focus the entire package towards planning and executing a dedicated CSAR Task Force to rescue an aircrew that was notionally shot down during a previous mission. This provides an outstanding opportunity for aircrew to work through the multitude of coordination issues that naturally arise during this high-priority mission, but takes two to four missions away from conducting traditional composite strike missions against targets and threats on the range. The broad range of outstanding training opportunities simply cannot fit into a typical two-week Red Flag deployment.
Finally, it is still unclear how to balance the diverse training requirements of AOG personnel deploying to the Nellis CAOC with the important tactical training accomplished in Red Flag.
The more Red Flag focuses on executing real-time command and control during live-fly missions, the less training tactical aircrews will get in decentralized mission planning and execution. In December 1978, TAC conducted a feasibility experiment to determine if Red Flag and Blue Flag could be combined into a combined flying and command and control exercise.
The results were not surprising:
In common with their Blue Flag counterparts, the Red Flag aircrews reacted unfavorably to the combination, and a majority felt that training was degraded rather than enhanced…. Perhaps the most telling commentary, however, lay in the observation that the two exercise formats were at odds because they stressed widely divergent aspects of the air combat process: the macro-tactics applicable in a free-flowing scenario at the numbered air force level, and the micro-tactics utilized by strike flights and individual flight elements.
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There is a clear benefit in incorporating a Blue Force AOC into Red Flag-so the AOG staff and tactical-level participants can experience the "fog and friction" of actual live-fly missions and then discuss problems in the Red Flag mass debrief. However there is bound to be some impact on tactical-level training as a result of this change.
Inconsistent Training for AEFs
As indicated in Chapter 2, not all Red Flag exercises are created equally. US-only Red
Flags bring together a robust mix of strike, stealth, C2ISR, EW, space and IW platforms and capabilities in a exercise that truly reflects the way the CAF will fight in future conflicts. US- 
Chapter 4 Recommendations for Training Transformation
The rigorous and realistic training regimen which our military conducts provides our forces with extraordinary battlefield advantages…. For this advantage to persist in the future, we must transform our training in the same way we transform the rest of the force. 
Large-Scale Range Upgrades
More than any other factor, the quality of realistic at Red Flag will be determined by the state of the NTTR. The dramatic shift in Blue Force capabilities and expanded training focus has not been matched by an equivalent effort to update range capabilities or assessment tools. In order to address this significant training shortfall, the Air Force must undertake a rangeimprovement initiative-similar to CORONET REAL-to increase the fidelity of the NTTR. It must create a realistic IADS that can simulate the latest-generation SAM systems and present targetable links and nodes that connect these systems to a realistic command and control facility.
The range should also incorporate a robust mix of assessable low-altitude SAM and AAA simulators. Finally, sufficient manning must exist to support 24/7 range operations. Red Flag training scenarios must change to reflect the most dangerous threat anticipated-i.e. a modern adversary employing an advanced and overlapping IADS-rather than the easiest threat to replicate or even the most likely expected threat. Finally, range upgrades should also include replicating modern target sets such as underground and hardened facilities, urban target complexes, and mobile targets such as convoys and SCUD launchers.
Effects-Based Assessment Tools and Procedures
The addition of an operational-level component to Red Flag exercises will require the Red Flag staff to give participants feedback on the overall effect of their integrated missions, and the range must incorporate new assessment systems that can show the effectiveness of EW and other effects-based operations on the NTTR. This will require the development of new assessment tools that provide real-time and recordable feeds, just as NACTS captures and reconstructs the air-to-air war over the range today. New assessment procedures-overseen by White Force assessors-can also aid in filling gaps in threat realistic threat replication. For example, it may not be possible to simulate and assess the impact of unguided AAA on the range. However, White Force assessors can use the Red ground order of battle to determine "high threat" areas where aircraft would be engaged by AAA, and then use statistical methods (i.e. roll the dice) to determine if low-flying aircraft transitioning these areas were damaged or destroyed.
An even greater challenge may be capturing data and providing assessment to the Blue twelve minutes from target detection to target destruction and assessment is good feedback for CAOC participants. More importantly, someone must also provide feedback on whether the targets engaged were truly the most fleeting or highest priority targets, and point out time critical targets that were not even detected. This may require better tools, technology, and manning.
Bring Back "Green Flag"
As previously discussed, the US-only Red Flag exercises are so unique in their force makeup and training focus that they cannot compare with a standard Red Flag exercise. In order to ensure that all AEFs receive equivalent training experiences, ACC should re-designate the two annual US-only Red Flag periods as "Green Flag" exercises. Today's US-only Red Flags incorporate many of the same ISR and EW participants that participated in past Green Flag exercises, and bringing back Green Flag will help concentrate these low-density/high demand assets into two exercise periods each year. Additionally, the new Green Flag exercises would reintroduce NAF staffs (AOG personnel) into realistic training exercises on a routine basis.
Green Flag would be the best opportunity to exercise a Blue Force CAOC staff in a complex live-fly environment-something they would not get in a standard Red Flag exercise. Every Red Flag exercise should still incorporate some degree of EW training, just as "greened up" Red Flags do today. However, designating US-only Red Flags as a new exercise will ensure that all units participate in this specialized training opportunity.
In addition to bringing back Green Flag exercises, the Air Force should consider designating Joint Red Flag exercises as a new type of "Flag" exercise. These joint exercises will also provide participants a different training experience than the typical Red Flag, and using different exercise names for different types of training will ensure everyone understands the unique training focus of these exercises.
Create Modular Training Blocks
Not all specialized training events will necessitate coming up with a specialized Flag designator. Some unique training can still be accomplished during standard Red Flag exercises without significantly changing the focus of the entire exercise. In order to prioritize and deconflict training in Red Flag, ACC should create modular training blocks similar to the training "scenarios" developed for the original Red Flag. Air Combat Command is currently considering extending the length of Red Flag to three-week periods to deal with the increased training focus of today's Red Flag. However, simply extending the length of the exercise will not ensure unit training is optimized. Using a modular training syllabus would allow the Red Flag staff to build a customized exercise schedule that balances unit training objectives and optimizes the use of scarce range time and threat support. Modules that are mutually beneficial, such as strike and reconnaissance, could be employed simultaneously and might not require additional range time for mission execution. Other modules that have conflicting goals (DEAD vs. SEAD vs. ground-threat training) or can be staggered (as TST is normally added to the end of a mission) will have to be coordinated and deconflicted. Some training modules may even occur over several days (like a dedicated IADS roll-back campaign), but may not require all units to participate.
Modular training at Red Flag would also allow White Force to prioritize daily training events, and would clearly identify each mission's primary training audience and objectives. By prioritizing training modules, White Force will ensure training that can only be accomplished at Red Flag takes priority over training that can be met through other avenues. For example, Red Flag is one of the few exercises available for tactical aircrews to practice large-force employment in a high threat environment. Most CAOC training, however, can also be accomplished in virtual and constructive exercises like Blue Flag or a number of other operational-level exercises.
Creating training modules will allow Red Flag planners to integrate the increasing number of specialized training events without detracting from Blue 4 training.
Formalize Future Red Flag Initiatives
None of these recommendations will result in the transformation of realistic training without the support of senior Air Force and DoD leaders. Many of the recent improvements to the Red Flag exercise have come from the individual initiative of the Red Flag and Nellis CAOC staffs.
However, the only way to institutionalize future initiatives and obtain the resources required to sustain an improved exercise is to formalize requirements and have them validated by senior Air Force and DoD leaders. More importantly, planners must be willing to abandon initiatives if the leadership decides not to invest the necessary resources to make them work.
Another problem in Red Flag transformation is that many changes have come down as higher-headquarters directives without any written guidance or detailed analysis by staff officers.
When senior Air Force leaders pass through Nellis AFB, they often meet with the Air Warfare Center Commander and offer their thoughts on Red Flag improvements. However, this type of direction short-circuits the headquarters staffing process that normally identifies the risks and benefits of implementing such changes. One such example was the CSAF's direction that Red Flag conduct an IADS roll-back campaign during the beginning of each exercise period.
Although this is the logical way to employ air forces during actual combat operations, exercising this at Red Flag has a dramatic impact on the traditional focus of high-intensity realistic training. Interdiction -Normally limited to a four-ship of strike aircraft attempting to strike a target, with air and ground aggressors targeting strike aircraft.
Armed Reconnaissance -This scenario included attack aircraft taking off without any assigned targets, and then flying at low-altitude in a designated area looking for targets. This is similar to today's "kill box" operations.
Combat Air Patrol -This scenario involved having air-to-air fighters protect a particular area from aggressor aircraft. Often called a "MIG CAP," it was designed to protect a high-value target on the ground from enemy air attacks.
Escort -This scenario had air-to-air fighters escorting strike aircraft, and occasionally SAC strategic bombers, through high-threat areas to protect them from aggressor aircraft. Fighters also conducted airlift/airdrop escort for missions over the Army's training range at Fort Irwin, California.
Strike Control and Reconnaissance (SCAR) -SCAR missions had tactical reconnaissance aircraft visually acquiring a target, and then meeting up with strike aircraft in a low-threat area.
Strike and reconnaissance aircraft then proceed to the target area, and the reconnaissance aircraft marked the target with smoke for the strike aircraft.
Composite Strike -Called "the heart of the Red Flag program," this involved twelve strike aircraft, six escort fighters, and four Wild Weasels for SAM suppression. The entire strike package was flown through a high-threat area (including ground-to-air and aggressor aircraft threats) on its way to the target area. In addition to exposing aircrew to air operations in a highthreat environment, this scenario required experienced aircrew to plan and execute a coordinated strike plan-using all available support assets-to destroy assigned targets. to afford the opportunity to fully integrate special access programs into aircrew training. The number of "U.S.-only" FLAGs each year will be determined by the ACC/XO staff based on CAF annual training requirements. The level of effort and fidelity of training presented in each of these periods will be determined by the ACC/XO staff in conjunction with the Air Warfare Center at Nellis AFB. 10. RED FLAG will not be used as a test bed for programs or tactics that are not operationally approved nor is it an environment to conduct inspections, evaluations, or mission qualification checks -Integration of any tests or nonoperational equipment into the RED FLAG program will require ACC/XO approval. Any tests or non-operational equipment integrated into RED FLAG with ACC/XO approval must be transparent to the training audience and must not drive the FLAG scenario in any way. Red Flag provides an open forum for inexperienced aircrew to improve their tactical airmanship skills and learn from their mistakes. An evaluation environment is not conducive to a non-attribution learning environment. 11. Red Flag will provide (NAF and) unit Intel a realistic training environment -Red Flag provides a solid mission planning opportunity for intelligence personnel to hone their skills and work with USAF, Sister service and coalition aircrews. Red Flag affords Intel personnel an opportunity to train at a FOL with fielded systems and architectures not available at their home unit. 
Glossary
